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Abstract
Emerging countries experience real exchange rate depreciations around defaults. In this paper,
we examine this observed pattern empirically and through the lens of a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model. The theoretical model explicitly incorporates bond issuances in local and
foreign currencies, and endogenous determination of real exchange rate and default risk. Our
quantitative analysis, using the case of Argentinas default in 2001, replicates the link between
real exchange rate depreciation and default probability around defaults and moments of the real
exchange rate that match the data. Prior to default, interactions of real exchange rate depreciation,
originated from a sequence of low tradable goods shocks with the sovereigns large share of foreign
currency debt, trigger defaults. In post-default periods, the resulting output costs and loss of
market access due to default lead to further real exchange rate depreciation.
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1 Introduction
Emerging market economies experience real exchange rate depreciations around the default events.
We rst empirically examine this stylized fact. The theoretical part of the paper explores interactions
between real exchange rate and default decision in a stochastic general equilibrium model featuring
defaultable debt. Our quantitative analysis, using Argentinas default episode in 2001, successfully
explains the link between real exchange rate depreciation and default probability and also matches
the relevant moments in the data.
In the empirical section, we present a new stylized fact on real exchange rate dynamics around
sovereign defaults. For 18 sovereign debt default and restructuring episodes in 1998-2013, we nd
the empirical link between the real exchange rate depreciation and default risk (default decision): In
the period prior default, the real exchange rate depreciation increases the burden of payments and
ultimately triggers the default. In the post-default period, the countrys announcement of default, or
restructuring, leads to further real exchange rate depreciation. Our results on cross-sectional analysis,
using these episodes, also conrm the observed link - a new contribution to the literature on sovereign
defaults. Motivated by this stylized fact, we aim to answer the following two questions which are
not explained in the literature: What drives real exchange rate depreciation leading to the countrys
default decision in the pre-default period? What leads to further real exchange rate depreciation in
the post-default period?
The theoretical part of this paper attempts to explore interactions between real exchange rate and
default decision in a standard dynamic model of defaultable debt, where a sovereign debtor borrows
from a foreign creditor through bond issuances in local and foreign currencies. Both the country and
the representative creditor are risk-averse and subject to tradable and non-tradable goods shocks.
The real exchange rate, dened as relative consumer price indices (CPI) between the sovereign and
the creditor, interacts with the prices of two debt instruments issued by the sovereign - incorporating
default risk which increases with level of debt. Prior to default, the sovereign, receiving a sequence
of low income shocks in tradable sector, tends to accumulate more debt and is more exposed to real
exchange rate depreciation due to increased default risk. Since a majority of debt is denominated
in foreign currency as observed in data, the real exchange rate depreciation increases the burden of
payments in terms of local currency, increasing default probability and ultimately proceeding to the
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default decision of the sovereign.
Once the sovereign declares default, it su¤ers output costs associated with default and loses access
to the markets. By achieving nancial autarky, the sovereign opts to have higher consumption of
traded goods, indicating lower marginal utility of consumption, which leads to higher prices of non-
traded goods and a higher overall price level relative to that of foreign creditors. Thus, it results in
a further depreciation of the real exchange rate. This mechanism drives the equilibrium depreciation
of the real exchange rate around defaults, and it is a plausible explanation of the observed patterns
in the data.
The model is calibrated to the case of Argentinas default in 2001. Our quantitative exercise
successfully replicates both business cycle and non-business-cycle moments that match with the data.
Most importantly, our model generates real exchange rate moments consistent with what we observe
in the Argentine data, particularly a higher average real exchange rate in the post-default periods
than in the pre-default periods. The current model explains the observed real exchange rate dynamics
around defaults.
We embed the real exchange rate dynamics and currency denomination of debt in a dynamic,
sovereign debt model with endogenous default. This part of the model builds on the recent quan-
titative analysis of sovereign debt such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), and Tomz
and Wright (2007), all of which are based on the classical setup of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). To
account for the creditors willingness to avoid real exchange rate risks and demanding an excess risk
premium as observed in the real world, we depart from the conventional risk-neutral investor assump-
tion. Instead, we assume a "representative" risk-averse creditor who faces exogenous income shocks,
as in Borri and Verdelhan (2009) and Lizarazo (2013). Our model also amends the tranditional debt
issuance in domestic currency and considers that a sovereign issues external bonds in both local and
foreign currencies, as observed in the data, extending a traditional assumption of domestic currency
debt issuance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Following the literature review, Section 2 overviews
stylized facts and empirical analysis on real exchange rate dynamics and sovereign defaults. We pro-
vide our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in Section 3. Recursive equilibrium of the
model is dened in Section 4. Quantitative analysis of the model is shown in Section 5. Section 6 dis-
cusses model implications. A short conclusion summarizes the discussion. A computation algorithm
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is presented in Appendix A.
1.1 Literature Review
Our paper builds on some strands of existing literature. First, this paper is related to the literature
of sovereign debt and defaults, which extends a classical model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and
applies quantitative analysis. Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) explore the connection
between endogenous default, interest rates and income uctuations in a model of sovereign debt and
generate empirical regularities in emerging markets. Arellano and Heathcote (2010) explore what
determines credit limits and how these vary across exchange rate regimes in a sovereign debt model.1
Asonuma (2012), Benjamin and Wright (2009), Bi (2008), and Yue (2010) model debt renegotiation
after defaults and explain observed evidence of debt restructurings. This paper di¤ers in that we
mainly focus on interactions between default choices and real exchange rate dynamics.
The second grouping of literature deals with sovereign debt and risk-averse investors. Borri and
Verdelhan (2009), Lizarazo (2013), and Presno and Puozo (2011) study the case of risk-averse lenders
and show that risk aversion allows the model to generate spreads larger than default probabilities,
as observed in emerging markets. Borri and Verdelhan (2009) consider risk aversion with external
habit preference, whereas Lizarazo (2013) assumes decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). On
the contrary, Presno and Puozo (2011) introduce fears about model misspecication for the lenders.
What distinguishes this current paper with these studies is that we incorporate real exchange rate
determination together with bond prices.
Lastly, this paper also contributes to the literature on currency compositions of external debt.
Jeanne (2003) claims that unpredictable monetary policy increasing the uncertainty in the future real
value of domestic currency debt may induce sovereigns to dollarize their liabilities. Bussiere, Fratzcher
and Koeniger (2004) link the exchange rate uncertainty in foreign currency debt to solvency of debt
and the choice of debt maturity, and Chamon and Hausmann (2004) explore theinterplay between
an individual borrowers choices for liability denomination through the e¤ect on optimal monetary
response of the central bank. On the contrary, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2004) consider
that an inability to borrow abroad in domestic currency ("original sin") is owing to structure and
1Jahjah et al. (2012) empirically analyze how exchange rate policy a¤ects the supply and pricing of sovereign bonds
in developing countries.
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operation of the international nancial system together with weakness of policies and institutions.234
This paper complements existing studies by explaining how behavior of foreign creditors, avoiding
the real exchange rate risk, leads to lending in foreign currency rather than local currency.5
2 Stylized Facts and Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide an observed evidence and empirical analysis on real exchange rate dynamics
and sovereign defaults. From recent sovereign default and restructuring episodes, there exists an
empirical link between real exchange rate depreciation and a sovereigns default choices. Our results
on cross-sectional analysis also support the observed link.
2.1 Real Exchange Rate Dynamics around Defaults/Restructurings
Figure 1 displays uctuations of real exchange rates against the US dollar in quarterly frequency
before and after defaults/announcements of restructurings from 18 episodes in 1998-2013.6 Following
denitions of preemptive and post-default restructurings in Asonuma and Trebesch (2013), we set t at
time of defaults for post-default restructuring cases and at time of announcements of restructurings
for preemptive episodes.78 Real exchange rates are normalized with respect to levels at the time of
2Burger and Warnock (2006) stress that by improving policy performance and strengthening institutions, emerging
economies may develop the local currency bond market, reduce their currency mismatch and lessen the likelihood of
future crises.
3Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) propose the following: borrowers can use unsecured debt in domestic
currency as collateral to obtain a loan in foreign currency. This reduces the interest rate on foreign currency debt since,
in the case of a crisis, the loss is partially transferred to lenders in domestic currency.
4 In addition, Corsetti and Mackowiak (2004) show how monetary and scal policies, including maturity and currency
denomination of debt, interact to determine the dynamic response of the economy and magnitude of devaluation and
ination.
5We relate our paper to the literature on portfolio allocation between an emerging market economy and an advanced
economy as in Devereux and Sutherland (2009) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010), which examine determinants of
optimal risk-sharing allocations. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2013) consider international portfolio with real exchange
rate and non-nancial risks that account for observed levels of equity home bias.
6We exclude episodes of default/debt restructurings of external debt held by o¢ cial creditors because of the absence
of precise data on defaults and announcements of restructurings. Moreover, for default/restructuring of external debt
held by private creditors, cases of Antigua and Barduba, Serbia and Montenegro, and Iraq are not included due to a
lack of quarterly data on both nominal exchange rates and CPI. The case of Greece is not included in our sample due
to the absence of nominal exchange rate against the euro associated with Eurozone membership.
7Asonuma and Trebesch (2013) introduce a new typology of two types of sovereign debt restructurings: those
implemented prior to a unilateral payment default, which they term preemptive, and those where the government
defaults rst and then starts to renegotiate its debt later on, which are termed as post-defaultcases.
8An alternative approach is to use selective default (SD) ratings on foreign currency debt by Standard and Poors.
We have a smaller sample of 12 default/restructuring episodes than our original sample of 18 episodes. This sample also
excludes episodes of defaults/restructurings of debt held by o¢ cial creditors. As expected, with the smaller sample, we
also replicate similar real exchange rate dynamics before/after downgrading to selective default ratings.
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defaults or announcements of restructurings. We observe an empirical link between the real exchange
rate depreciation and default risk (default choice): on one hand, the real exchange rate depreciation
increases a burden of payments for a sovereign country and triggers a default; on the other hand, the
countrys announcement of default or restructuring leads to further real exchange rate depreciation.
Exceptions are Ecuador in 2008 for the pre-default period and the Dominican Republic and Ukraine
2000 for the post-default period.91011
Figure 1: Real Exchange Rates Against the US Dollar Before and After Defaults/Restructurings
9The Ecuador 2008 episode can be treated as exceptional since it announced in December 2008 that the government
missed an interest payment of $30.6 million on its $510 million of 12% global bonds due in 2012. Prior to the announce-
ment, the authorities made statements in November 2008 that the 2012 and the 2030 securities were illegal and
illegitimate.Therefore, default was considered to be triggered by political decision rather than solvency or liquidity
concerns.
10The Dominican Republic in 2004-5 is also considered an outlier since it announced its debt restructuring on private
debt in April 2004, following restructuring on o¢ cial sector debt. However, its debt restructuring had proceeded in
two separate approaches. For bank loans, though the sovereign started its negotiation with creditors in August 2004,
it missed its payments in February 2005 and launched the nal exchange o¤er in June 2005, which was completed later
in October 2005. On the contrary, for external bonds, after negotiation was initiated in January 2005, the sovereign
launched the nal exchange o¤er in April 2005 and completed the exchange later in May 2005.
11 In the case of Ukraine 2000, the real exchange rate had been on a depreciation trend for 9 quarters until its peak in
January 2000 (depreciated by 95 percent compared to the level in November 1997) due to the rst default/restructuring
in 1998-9. Therefore, in the post-default period, we observed a slight rebound of the real exchange rate (appreciated by
15 percent compared to the level in January 2000).
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Source: Asonuma and Trebesch (2013), IMF IFS
2.2 Empirical Analysis of the Link
With our sample of 18 episodes, empirical analysis attempts to examine a relationship between real
exchange rate depreciations and default probability (default choice) in both pre-default and post-
default periods.12 First, in pre-default periods, we explore whether the level of lagged real exchange
rates leads to an increase in default probability. Our sample is in quarterly frequency, and each
episode covers periods from 5 quarters before to time of defaults/announcement of restructurings. For
a proxy for default probability, we use credit ratings on foreign currency debt, which are transformed
into discrete forms following Sy (2002).1314 One advantage of this approach is to capture the high
degree of variation in default probability. Since lagged real exchange rates are normalized, with
respect to their level at defaults/announcement of restructurings, these series reect the magnitude
of depreciations towards the levels at default/announcement of restructurings.15 Given the possibility
of an endogeneity problem, we apply a two-step generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation
using both US GDP deviation from the trend and the US Treasury bill rate as instruments for lagged
real exchange rates. These instruments have enough explanatory power, as shown in high Adj   R2
reported in Table A1 in Appendix 2. Our specication is the following:
Ratingt = ERt 1 + Zt 1 + Zt0 + "1;t (1)
where ERt 1 are estimates of lagged real exchange rates, Zt 1 and Zt are vectors of other explanatory
variables at time t   1 and t, respectively. Our choice of control variables has been guided by the
literature on sovereign debt crises and is especially close to Kohlscheen (2009) and Dreher and Walter
(2010). We include GDP growth rates, debt service-to-GDP, an indicator of institutional quality, and
1-year LIBOR rates in baseline specication, which are found to be key factors in the sovereign debt
crisis literature. An indicator of the IMF program is also added to the list since whether or not an
12Details and sources of variables used in empirical analysis are reported in Appendix B.
13The alternative approach is to use a binary variable showing default and non-default choices and to apply a probit
estimation. This method also provides results similar to Table 1, with a smaller degree of signicance. Our approach
enables us to receive benets of better ts derived by sovereign risk ratings, which capture the high degree of variation
in default probability.
14Sy (2002) convert S&Ps and Moodys ratings to numerical values using a linear scale from 0 to 20 with S.D. and
CC/Ca ratings corresponding to values of 0 and 1, respectively, and AAA/Aaa ratings being assigned a value of 20.
15We also regress with changes in real exchange rates and obtain results with less signicance.
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IMF-supported program is put in place a¤ects defaults or restructurings.
Baseline pooled regression results (2nd column) conrm that the real exchange rate depreciation
(lagged) increases default probability: depreciations, expressed by higher levels of real exchange rates
entered with lagged, lead to lower levels of ratings implying higher default probability/default choice.
In line with empirical ndings in the sovereign debt crisis literature, default probability is high if
GDP growth is low and debt burden (debt service-to-GDP) is high. This is consistent with ndings
in theoretical literature of sovereign debt and defaults using one-period bonds. Moreover, when an
indicator of institutional quality is low and a sovereign does not have an IMF-supported program,
the sovereign is more likely to default. The results are robust if we attempt to reect heterogeneity in
sovereign risk ratings by applying xed e¤ect regression (3rd column). All relevant variables, except
an indicator of the IMF program, remain in expected signs with signicance.
Table 1: Regression Results for the Pre-Default Period
Dependent variable: Ratings (A) Baseline. (B) Fixed e¤ect
Estimation 2-step GMM Pooled 2-step GMM Fixed-e¤ect
Real Exchange rate, lagged -14.34*** (2.49) -8.17*** (2.89)
GDP growth rate, lagged 0.17*** (0.06) 0.08** (0.04)
Debt service-to-GDP, lagged -0.09*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.03)
Institutional quality1 0.31*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04)
IMF program 1.24*** (0.40) -0.28 (0.09)
LIBOR 1-year -0.09 (0.14) 0.59*** (0.15)
Samples 48 48
Root MSE 1.23 0.60
Note: *, **, *** denote signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
1Institutional quality is the quarterly average of monthly PRC composite risk ratings from 1985-2012, with
100 and 0 as the highest and lowest indices, respectively.
Next, for the post-default period, we analyze whether default choices of sovereigns inuence real
exchange rate depreciation in subsequent periods. Our sample is in quarterly frequency, and each
episode covers periods from time of defaults or announcements of restructurings to 5 quarters after.
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Ratings on sovereign bonds are treated as indicators of default choices.16 The same method of a
two-step GMM regression is taken using credit ratings of other emerging countries in other regions
with a similar size and degree of openness and quality of institution as instruments for lagged default
probability. High Adj   R2 in Table A2 in Appendix B conrms high explanatory power of these
instruments. We apply the following specication:
ERt = Ratingt 1 + Zt + Zt 10 + "2;t (2)
where Ratingt 1 are estimates of lagged ratings, Zt 1 and Zt are vectors of other explanatory vari-
ables at time t   1 and t, respectively. For choice of control variables, we follow the literature on
determinants of real exchange rates, especially Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2001) and IMF (2006). The
set of explanatory variables in baseline specication includes GDP growth rate di¤erential, real in-
terest rate di¤erential, net foreign assets-to-GDP and real oil price shock, which are considered to
be dominant determinants of real exchange rates in the literature. In addition to these variables, we
also include an indicator of an IMF program and 1-year LIBOR rates because real exchange rates are
also inuenced by the conditionality under an IMF program and global liquidity.
From baseline pooled regression results, we see that sovereignsdefault choices, expressed as lower
credit ratings, induce real exchange rate depreciations: defaults denoted by lower levels of ratings,
entered with lagged, lead to real exchange rate depreciation shown by a higher level of subsequent real
exchange rates. Similar to what the literature on determinants of real exchange rates has explained,
real exchange rates depreciate when GDP growth rates and real interest rates are lower than those
of partner countries and the sovereign reduces net foreign assets. An increase in real oil prices,
considered as terms of trade shock, leads to depreciation in real exchange rates since deterioration of
the terms of trade of a country should result in a real exchange rate depreciation of that country. On
the contrary, neither the IMF program nor LIBOR rates have signicant inuence over real exchange
rates. Obtained results are robust, even if we apply the pooled regression with global liquidity proxied
by LIBOR rates and xed e¤ect regression.
16Using a binary variable showing default and non-default choices as one of the explanatory variables is an alternative
approach. We obtain similar results shown in Table 2 with less signicance.
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Table 2: Regression results for the Post-Default Period
Dependent variable: Real Exchange Rates (A) Baseline. (B) w. Global liquidity (C) Fixed e¤ect
Estimation 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM
Pooled / Fixed-e¤ect Pooled Pooled Fixed-e¤ect
Ratings, lagged -0.25*** (0.03) -0.26*** (0.03) -0.11*** (0.04)
GDP growth di¤erential, lagged -0.02** (0.009) -0.02** (0.01) -0.017** (0.009)
Real interest rate di¤erential, lagged -0.004*** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) -0.009** (0.002)
Net foreign assets-to-GDP, lagged -0.05*** (0.013) -0.05*** (0.014) -0.053*** (0.02)
Real oil price shock dummy, lagged1 2.67 (1.62) 3.04* (1.57) 1.55* (0.90)
IMF program 1.36 (1.10) 1.53 (1.07) 0.49 (0.67)
LIBOR 1-year - 0.07 (0.05) 0.13* (0.07)
Constant 0.72 (1.06) 0.43 (1.02) 0.77 (0.55)
Samples 32 32 32
Root MSE 0.30 0.30 0.18
Note: *, **, *** denote signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
1Real oil price shock is an indicator showing the world oil price index deated by the US Producer Price
Index (PPI) for countries heavily dependent on oil prices, while 0 is given for those less dependent on oil
prices.
3 Model Environment
3.1 General Points
The basic structure of the model is in line with previous work, extending the sovereign debt model
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).17 Our model embeds real exchange rate dynamics and currency
denomination in a two-country framework. We consider a risk-averse sovereign and a representative
risk-averse creditor. Their preferences are shown by following utility functions:
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct); E0
1X
t=0
()t u(ct )
17Our incomplete market assumption of capital market under the two-country framework follows Benigno and Thoenis-
sen (2008) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).
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where 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor of the sovereign, and 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor of the
creditor. ct and ct denote consumptions of borrower and lender in period t, and u(:) is one-period
utility function, which is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and satises the Inada
conditions. A discount factor of the sovereign reects both pure time preference and probability that
the current sovereignty will survive into next period, whereas a discount factor of the creditor shows
only pure time preference. An assumption of a risk-averse creditor is in line with the behavior of
investors in emerging nancial markets, who prefer to avoid real exchange rate risks.18
All information on income processes of two parties and bond issuances is perfect and symmetric.
In each period, the sovereign starts with total debt bt, a fraction dominated in local currency bt,
and the remaining denominated in foreign currency (1 )bt. We provide a brief explanation of xed
share of foreign currency debt in Section 3.3.
Both the sovereign and creditor receive stochastic endowment streams of tradable goods yTt ,
yTt and non-tradable goods yNt , yNt . We denote yt, a column vector of four income processes:
yt =

yTt ; y
T
t ; y
N
t ; y
N
t

. It is stochastic, drawn from a compact set Y =

yTmin; y
T
max
yTmin; yTmax
yNmin; y
N
max
  yNmin; yNmax  R4+. (yt+1jyt) is probability distribution of a vector of shocks yt+1
conditional on previous realization yt. Both sovereign and creditor consume not only non-tradable
goods, but also two types of tradable goods endowed in each country. They export their own endowed
tradable goods and import tradable goods endowed in the counterparts country. When the sovereign
repays its debt and issues new debt, it can import tradable goods endowed in the creditors country
more than its exports of tradable goods, i.e. having the current account decit. On the contrary,
when the sovereign defaults, it only imports tradable goods endowed in the creditors country equal
to its exports of tradable goods, i.e. having the current account balanced.
The representative creditor is risk-averse. As mentioned above, it is also subject to stochastic
income shocks and opts to smooth its consumption through lending/borrowing to the sovereign. The
risk-averse creditor prefers to avoid real exchange rate risks and opts to issue bonds in their local
18Lizarazo (2013) explains that assumption of risk-averse creditors seems to be justied by characteristics of the
investors in emerging nancial markets. These investors are both individuals and institutional investors such as banks,
mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds and insurance companies. For individual investors, it is straightforward
to assume that these agents are risk-averse. For institutional investors, risk aversion may follow from two sources:
regulations over the composition of their portfolio and the characteristics of the institutionsmanagement. Regarding
the rst source, these entities face restrictions on asset allocations; for instance, banks are regulated by capital adequacy
ratio. Regarding the second source, for each class of institutional investor, managers ultimately make the portfolio
allocation decisions. These managers can also be treated as risk-averse managers.
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currency. A large fraction of external debt denominated in foreign currency, shown in Section 3.3, also
reects behavior of a risk-averse creditor. Risk-averseness, rather than risk-neutrality, is necessary
for determination of real exchange rate depending not only on the sovereigns but also the creditors
income shocks.
The international capital market is incomplete. The sovereign and creditor can borrow and lend
only via one-period, zero-coupon bonds indexed to their consumer price index (CPI), and there are two
types of bonds the sovereign (creditor) issues: bonds denominated in local and foreign currency. bt+1
(bt+1) denotes the amount of bonds to be repaid next period whose set is shown by B = [bmin; bmax] 
R where bmin  0  bmax. We set the lower bound at bmin <  yTmax=r, which is the largest debt that
the sovereign could repay. The upper bound bmax is the high level of assets that the sovereign may
accumulate.19 The upper bound is the highest level of assets that the sovereign can accumulate, and
the lower bound is the highest level of debt that it can hold. We assume qi(bt+1; yt) (i 2 fH;Fg) to
be the price of bonds with asset position bt+1 and a vector of income shocks yt. We assume that qH
and qF are denominated in local and foreign currency, respectively. Price functions of both bonds
are determined in equilibrium.
We dene the current real exchange rate et as units of local currency against one unit of foreign
currency as in Walsh (2003). An increase in et means one unit of domestic currency buys fewer units
of foreign currency. Thus, a rise in et corresponds to a fall in the value of domestic currency, i.e.
depreciation of domestic currency. The real exchange rate is also determined in equilibrium together
with bond prices.
We assume that the creditor always commits to repay its debt. However, the sovereign is free
to decide whether to repay its debt or to default. If the sovereign chooses to repay its debt, it will
preserve its status to issue bonds next period. On the contrary, if it chooses not to pay its debt, it
is then subject to both exclusion from the international capital market and direct output costs. The
sovereign su¤ers symmetric output costs on tradable and non-tradable goods. This assumption is
consistent with none of the empirical ndings justifying asymmetric output costs across tradable and
non-tradable sectors in the literature of costs of sovereign defaults.20 We consider that the debtor
19bmax exists when the interest rates on the sovereigns savings are su¢ ciently low compared to the discount factor,
which is satised as (1 + r) < 1:
20Though it is within the manufacturing goods sector, not across the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors,
Borensztein and Panizza (2010) nd that a more export-oriented industry would see its severe growth drop relative
to a less export-oriented industry in each year in which the sovereign is in default.
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defaults total external debt (bt). Defaulting total external debt is supported by evidence on recent
external debt restructurings, where sovereigns default on both local and foreign currency debt issued
at the international market.21
When a default is chosen, the sovereign will be in temporary autarky. After being excluded
from the market for one period, with exogenous probability , it will regain access to the market.
Otherwise, it will remain in nancial autarky next period.
3.2 Timing of the Model
Timing of decisions within each period is summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Timing of the Model
The sovereign starts the current period with total debt bt, comprised of local and foreign currency
debt. After observing a vector of income shocks yt, the sovereign chooses either to pay its debt or to
default.
If the sovereign chooses to pay the total debt, given bond price schedules and the real exchange
rate, it chooses next period total debt bt+1 and current consumption c
T;H
t , c
T;F
t and c
N
t . Then, default
probability is determined. Given bond prices and the real exchange rate, the creditor chooses bt+1
consistent with the belief of default probability, and consumption cT;Ht , c
T;F
t ; and c
N
t . Bond prices
together with the real exchange rate are determined in equilibrium.
21There are only a few episodes where sovereigns apparently di¤erentiate creditors of foreign currency and local
currency external debt.
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On the contrary, if the sovereign opts to default, it su¤ers direct output costs due to default dyTt
and dyNt . The debtor will be in nancial autarky and cannot raise funds at the international capital
market this period (bt+1 = 0). It simply chooses its current consumption c
T;H
t , c
T;F
t and c
N
t . Only
the real exchange rate (et) is determined at equilibrium.
3.3 Fixed Share of Foreign Currency Debt
We explain, succinctly, a rationale of assumption on share of foreign currency debt. Figure 3 shows
shares of foreign currency debt in annual frequency before and after defaults and restructurings for
18 episodes from 1999-2013.22 We compute shares of foreign currency debt for 18 episodes using data
of international bond issuance from Bloomberg and Dealogic.23 A majority of countries, which have
experienced defaults or restructurings recently, had a large fraction of their external debt, close to
100 percent, denominated in foreign currency both before and after defaults and restructurings. Even
among four exceptional cases, three episodes, such as the Dominican Republic in 2004-5, Grenada
in 2004-5 and Uruguay in 2003, witnessed a decrease in share of foreign currency denominated debt
only after defaults or announcements of restructurings. In addition, these countries seldom changed
shares of foreign currency debt, as shown in limited variations over the sample period in Figure 3.24
These clearly support our assumption of xed and high shares of foreign currency debt.
22Data on bond issuances for Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis are not available.
23Due to a lack of currency denomination data on loans from Dealogic, our computed shares are based only on bond
issuances.
24Small variance in share of foreign currency denominated debt over the sample period reported in Table A1 in
Appendix C also supports our assumption.
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Figure 3: Share of Foreign Currency Debt Before and After Defaults or Announcements of
Restructurings
Source: Asonuma and Trebesch (2013), Bloomberg and Dealogic.
4 Recursive Equilibrium
In this section, we dene the stationary recursive equilibrium of the model. Our framework incor-
porates three key features: (1) optimal behavior of a risk-averse foreign creditor, (2) two types of
external bonds denominated in local and foreign currencies, and (3) endogenous determination of real
exchange rate in equilibrium.
4.1 The Sovereign Countrys Problem
The countrys problem is to maximize the expected lifetime utility given by
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct) (3)
A consumption basket ct is dened by the CES aggregates of consumption shown as
ct =
h
!
1
 (cTt )
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (cNt )
 1

i 
 1
(4)
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where cTt and c
N
t are consumptions of tradable and non-tradable goods, and  is the elasticity of
intratemporal substitutions between these goods. The tradable component is, in turn, comprised of
local and foreign-endowed goods in the following manner:
cTt =
h

1
 (cT;Ht )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cT;Ft )
 1

i 
 1
(5)
where cT;Ht and c
T;F
t are consumptions of traded goods endowed in the country and the creditors
country, respectively.  is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between traded goods endowed
in the country and the creditors country.
Corresponding to the CES bundles of consumption goods, we have an isomorphic price index:
pt =

!(pTt )
1  + (1  !)(pNt )1 
 1
1  (6)
where pTt and p
N
t are prices of traded and non-traded goods. The price of tradable goods is the
numeraire (pTt = 1). The tradable good price is, in turn, comprised of prices of local and foreign-
endowed goods:
1 =
h
(pT;Ht )
1  + (1  )(etpT;Ft )1 
i 1
1 
(7)
where pT;Ht and p
T;F
t are prices of traded goods endowed in each country.
Let V (bt; yt) be the lifetime value function of the country that starts the current period with
initial assets bt and a vector of income shocks yt. Given sovereign bond prices qi(bt+1; yt) i = H;F
and the real exchange rate et, the country solves its optimization problem.
If the country decides to pay its debt, it chooses its next-period assets (bt+1) and current con-
sumption after paying back its initial debt. On the contrary, if the country defaults, it will not be
able to issue bonds in the current period. It simply chooses current consumption.
Given its option to default, V (bt; yt) satises
V (bt; yt) = max

V R(bt; yt); V
D(yt)

(8)
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where V R(bt; yt) is its value, which the country chooses to pay debt given as
V R(bt; yt) = max
cT;Ht ;c
T;F
t ;c
N
t ;bt+1
u(ct) + 
Z
Y
V (bt+1; yt+1)d(yt+1jyt) (9)
s:t: pT;Ht c
T;H
t + etp
T;F
t c
T;F
t + p
N
t c
N
t + pt

qH(bt+1; yt)+ etq
F (bt+1; yt)(1  )

bt+1
= pT;Ht y
T
t + p
N
t y
N
t + pt [+ et(1  )] bt
s:t: (4) & (5)
and V D(yt) is the value, which the country decides to default, shown as
V D(yt) = max
cT;Ht ;c
T;F
t ;c
N
t
u(ct) + 
24Z
Y
V (0; yt+1)d(yt+1jyt) + (1  )
Z
Y
V D(yt+1)d(yt+1jyt)
35 (10)
s:t: pT;Ht c
T;H
t + etp
T;F
t c
T;F
t + p
N
t c
N
t = (1  d)pT;Ht yTt + (1  d)pNt yNt
s:t: (4) & (5)
where V (0; yt+1) is its value next period with no initial debt. dp
T;H
t y
T
t and dp
N
t y
N
t express output
costs, which the country su¤ers due to a default. When the country decides the next-period assets,
it also takes into consideration impacts of the real exchange rate, which is determined by optimality
conditions of the sovereign debtor and the creditor.
The countrys default policy can be characterized by default set D(bt)  Y . The default set is a
set of income vectors ys for which default is optimal given the debt position bt.
D(bt) =

yt 2 Y : V R(bt; yt) < V D(yt)
	
(11)
In the case where the country chooses to pay its debt, we obtain the following optimality condi-
tions:
cTt
cNt
=

!
1  !

1
pNt
 
(12)
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cT;Ht
cT;Ft
=


1  
 
pT;Ht
etp
T;F
t
! 
(13)

qH(bt+1; yt)+ etq
F (bt+1; yt)(1  )

= Et


u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
1Non Default [+ et+1(1  )]

(14)
On the contrary, if the country chooses to default, we have equation (12) and (13), not (14).
4.2 The Foreign Creditors Problem
The foreign creditor is also risk-averse and behaves competitively at the market. The problem is
maximizing its expected lifetime utility given by
E0
1X
t=0
()t u(ct ) (15)
Its consumption basket ct is similar to that of the country:
ct =
h
(!)
1
 (cTt )
 1
 + (1  !) 1 (cNt )
 1

i 
 1
(16)
where cTt and cNt are consumptions of traded and non-traded goods. Tradable goods consumption
is composed of consumptions of two tradable goods: cT;Ht and c
T;F
t :
cTt =
h
()
1
 (cT;Ht )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cT;Ft )
 1

i 
 1
(17)
Corresponding to the CES bundles of consumption goods, we have an isomorphic price index:
pt =
h
(!) (pT

t )
1  + (1  !)(pNt )1 
i 1
1 
(18)
where pTt and pNt are prices of traded and non-traded goods. The tradable goods price of the
creditor is similar to that of the country shown as:
pTt =
24(1  ) pT;Ht
et
!1 
+ (pT;Ft )
1 
35 11  (19)
If the country repays its debt, the creditor also decides its assets for next period (bt+1) and current
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consumption cT;Ht , c
T;F
t , and c
N
t subject to its budget constraint, such as
pT;Ht
et
cT;Ht +p
T;F
t c
T;F
t +p
N
t c
N
t +p

t
264 qH(bt+1;yt)et 
+qF (bt+1; yt)(1  )
375 bt+1 = pT;Ft yTt +pNt yNt +pt  1et+ (1  )

bt
(20)
Then, we obtain the following optimality conditions:
cTt
cNt
=

!
1  !

pTt
pNt
 
(21)
cT;Ft
cT;Ht
=


1  
 
pT;Ft
pT;Ht =et
! 
(22)

qH(bt+1; yt)
et
+ qF (bt+1; yt)(1  )

= Et


u0(ct+1)
u0(ct )
1Non Default

1
et+1
+ (1  )

(23)
If the country defaults, the creditor maximizes its utility by choosing current consumption cT;Ht ,
cT;Ft , and cNt subject to its budget constraint:
pT;Ht
et
cT;Ht + p
T;F
t c
T;F
t + p
N
t c
N
t = p
T;F
t y
T
t + p
N
t y
N
t (24)
Then, we have we have equation (21) and (22), not (23).
4.3 Bond Prices and Real Exchange Rate
Bond prices indexed to the sovereigns and creditors CPI qi(bt+1; yt) for i = H;F are functions of the
next-period assets and a vector of income shocks. If the country chooses to pay its debt, the creditor
receives payo¤s equal to the face value of bonds, which is normalized to 1. If the country chooses to
default, payo¤s are zero. We derive bond price functions for both the sovereigns and the creditors
Euler equations, which take into account the sovereigns decision of paying its debt and defaulting.

qH(bt+1; yt)+ etq
F (bt+1; yt)(1  )

= Et


u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
1Non Default [+ et+1(1  )]

(25)

qH(bt+1; yt)
et
+ qF (bt+1; yt)(1  )

= Et


u0(ct+1)
u0(ct )
1Non Default

1
et+1
+ (1  )

(26)
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The real exchange rate is dened as relative CPI between the sovereign and the creditors as
et =
pt
pt
(27)
4.4 Market Clearing Conditions for Goods and Bonds
If the country repays its debt in the current period, market clearing conditions for tradable goods
and non-tradable goods are
cT;Ht + c
T;H
t = y
T
t (28)
cT;Ft + c
T;F
t = y
T
t (29)
cNt = y
N
t (30)
cNt = y
N
t (31)
On the contrary, in the case of default, the following are market clearing conditions for tradable
goods and non-tradable goods endowed in the country.
cT;Ht + c
T;H
t = (1  d)yTt (28)
cNt = (1  d)yNt (30)
Market clearing condition for bonds is
bt + (1  )bt = 0 (32)
where  denotes the size of the sovereign economy relative to the creditor.
4.5 Recursive Equilibrium
We dene a stationary equilibrium in the model.
Denition 1 A recursive equilibrium is a set of functions for (A) the countrys value func-
tion V (bt; yt); consumption, c
T;H
t (bt; yt), c
T;F
t (bt; yt), c
N
t (bt; yt); asset position bt+1(bt; yt) and default
set D(bt); (B) foreign creditors consumption c
T;H
t (bt; yt), c
T;F
t (bt; yt), c
N
t (bt; yt); asset position
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bt+1(bt; yt); and (C) bond prices qi(bt+1; yt) for i = H;F and the real exchange rate et(bt+1; yt) such
that
[1] Given bond prices and the real exchange rate, the countrys value function V (bt; yt); consump-
tion, cT;Ht (bt; yt), c
T;F
t (bt; yt), c
N
t (bt; yt); asset position bt+1(bt; yt); and default set D(bt) satisfy the
countrys optimization problem.
[2] Given bond prices and the real exchange rate, the creditors consumption cT;Ht (bt; yt), c
T;F
t (bt; yt),
cNt (bt; yt) and asset position bt+1(bt; yt) satisfy the creditors optimization problem.
[3] Bond bond prices qi(bt+1; yt) for i = H;F and the real exchange rate et(bt+1; yt) satisfy opti-
mality conditions of two parties.
[4] Market clearing conditions for goods and bonds are satised.
In equilibrium, default probability p(bt+1; yt) is related to the sovereigns default decision in the
following manner:
p(bt+1; yt) =
Z
D(bt+1)
d(yt+1jyt) (33)
Risk-free interest rate is dened as
1
1 + r(bt+1; yt)
= Et

u0(ct+1)
u0(ct )

(34)
We dene total spreads for domestic and foreign currency debt evaluated by the creditors side as
follows:
sH(bt+1; yt) =
et
qH(bt+1; yt)
  1  r(bt+1; yt) (35)
sF (bt+1; yt) =
1
qF (bt+1; yt)
  1  r(bt+1; yt) (36)
5 Quantitative Analysis
This section provides quantitative analysis of model. Our major ndings can be summarized as
follows. First, at the steady state distribution, we show that at any level of tradable goods, the real
exchange rate tends to depreciate sharply when the sovereign defaults. Moreover, the real exchange
rate depreciates when the sovereign receives a low tradable goods shock. Second, our simulation
exercise uses Argentine default in 2001 and replicates both business cycle and non-business cycle
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regularities, including moments of the real exchange rates in both pre-default and post-default periods.
Lastly, most importantly, the model generates the link between real exchange rate dynamics and
default choices (default probability) around default.
5.1 Parameters and Functional Forms,
We use most of the parameters and functional forms specied in previous work. There are three
new elements in the model associated with a two-country, four-goods set-up: (i) relative size of the
sovereign, (ii) weights on consumption of home-endowed tradable goods, and (iii) share of domestic
currency debt.
The following utility functions are used in numerical simulation:
u(ct) =
c1 t
1   ; u(c

t ) =
c1 t
1   (37)
where  expresses degree of risk aversion. We set  equal to 2, which is commonly used in real
business cycle analysis for advanced economy and emerging markets. The creditors discount factor
is set to  = 0:982 to replicate the risk-free interest rate of 1.7%.25 The elasticity of substitution
between tradable and non-tradable consumption is taken from Gonzales and Neumeyer (2003) where
they estimate the elasticity for Argentina to be equal to 0.48. We assume an elasticity of substitution
between tradable goods endowed in the sovereign and the creditor country , of 2, as in Benigno
and Thoenissen (2008). Weights of tradable goods consumption and home-endowed tradable goods
consumptions are set to ! = 0:51, ! = 0:5 and  =  = 0:5 in order to have the price of tradable
goods at steady-state distribution (pT = 1).
The probability of re-entry to credit markets after defaults is set at  = 0:282, which is consistent
with observed evidence regarding the exclusion from credit markets of defaulting countries mentioned
in Gelos et al (2011). Output loss parameter d is assumed to be 2% following Sturzenegger (2002)s
estimates.
We assume each exogenous endowment stream yit for i = fT;N; T ; Ng follows a log-normal
25Similarly, Lizarazo (2013) set the creditors discount rate as  = 0:98 to generate the international interest rate of
1.7%.
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AR(1) process where innovations to the shocks are allowed to be correlated:
log(yit) = log(y
i) + iy
 
log(yit 1)  log(yi)

+ iy (38)
where yi is the mean income, E[iy] = 0 for i = fT;N; T ; Ng and the variance-covariance matrix of
the error terms is the following:
E[0] =
266666664
T TN TT TN
TN N NT NN
TT NT T TN
TN NN TN N
377777775
=
266666664
0:0027 0:0019 0 0
0:0019 0:0019 0 0
0 0 0:0006 0:0002
0 0 0:0002 0:0002
377777775
(39)
where  = [Ty ; 
N
y ; 
T
y ; 
N
y ]
0. Auto-correlation coe¢ cients and the variance-covariance matrix are
computed from the quarterly real GDP data of Argentina from 1993Q1 to 2011Q4 (sovereign) and of
the US from 1988Q1 to 2011Q4. Sector-level GDP data are seasonally adjusted and are taken from the
Ministry of Economy and Production (MECON) and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The sectoral classication into tradable and non-tradable goods follows the traditional approach
adopted in real business cycle literature. The tradable goods sector comprises "manufacturing" and
the primary sectors, whereas the non-tradable goods sector is composed of remaining sectors. The
data are detrended using Hodrick-Prescott lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Each shock
is then discretized into a nite state Markov chain by using a quadrature procedure in Hussey and
Tauchen (1991) from their joint distribution. We obtain estimated coe¢ cients such as T = 0:59 and
N = 0:70 for Argentina and T = 0:49 and N = 0:67 for the US.
For remaining country-specic parameters, size of the sovereign relative to that of the creditor
is set to 0.025 to reect the ratio of US dollar GDP of Argentina to that of the US over the period
1993-2012. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) report that Argentina experienced 6 defaults in
1820-2004. We specify the sovereigns discount factor  = 0:86 (Argentina) to replicate the average
default frequency of 3.4%. The share of domestic currency debt is set at 0.01 based on the average
share over the period 1996-2006 from Bloomberg and Dealogic.
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Table 3: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Sources
General
Risk aversion  = 2 RBC literature
Elast. of sub. b/w cT , cT  = 0:48 Gonzales and Neumeyer (2003)
Elast. of sub. b/w cT;H , cT;F  = 2 Benign and Thoenissen (2008)
Weight of cT , cT in CES ! = 0:51, ! = 0:50 Computed
Weight of cT;H , cT;F in CES  = = 0:5 Computed
Probability of reentry  = 0:282 Gelos et al (2011)
Output cost d= 0:02 Sturzenegger (2002)
Discount rate - Creditor = 0:982 Computed
Autoreg. of income - creditor N= 0:67, T= 0:49 Computed - US BEA
Sovereign specic
Autoreg. of income - country N= 0:70, T= 0:59 Computed - MECON,
Relative size of sovereign  = 0:025 IMF WEO
Discount rate  = 0:86 Computed
Share of dome. curre. debt  = 0:01 Bloomberg/Dealogic
5.2 Numerical Results on Equilibrium Properties
In this subsection, we cover the equilibrium properties of the model. Figure 4 shows that the default
probability at mean level of tradable goods is weakly increasing with respect to the level of total
debt. Furthermore, default probability is weakly increasing respect to level of tradable goods. These
two ndings are consistent with recent quantitative analysis of sovereign debt - as in Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008) and Yue (2010) - that the sovereign is more likely to default when
it has accumulated its debt and a bad income shock.
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Figure 4: Default Probability
Figure 5: Real Exchange Rates
Figure 5 displays that, at a given level of tradable goods below threshold of debt/GDP ratio where
the sovereign opts to default, a low level of real exchange rate meaning appreciation is associated with
a high current debt/GDP ratio. With xed tradable goods income shock, higher current debt leads
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to lower consumption of tradable goods (with less tradable goods endowment left for consumption)
indicating higher marginal utility of consumption. This, in turn, results in both the lower price of
tradable goods and the lower overall price. On the contrary, when the sovereign defaults at current
debt, the real exchange rate tends to depreciate. By defaulting, the sovereign prefers to have higher
consumption of tradable goods, indicating lower marginal utility of consumption, which leads to both
a higher price of non-traded goods and a higher overall price level.
Moreover, the level of the real exchange rate is high implying depreciation when the sovereign
has a low level of traded goods. With a low level of traded goods, the sovereign tends to accumulate
higher debt which leads to an increase in default probability. Then, the real exchange rate depreciates
and is associated with an increase in default probability. Price functions for newly-issued debt and
debt level are shown in Appendix C.
5.3 Simulation - Argentina
We conduct 1000 rounds of simulations, with 2000 periods per round and then extract the last
200 periods to analyze features evaluated at the steady-state distribution. In the last 200 periods,
we choose 40 observations before and after a default event to compare with moments in data for
Argentina. The second column in Table 4 and 5 summarizes moments of data.26 Output data are
seasonally adjusted from the MECON for 1993Q1-2001Q3 and 2001Q4-2011Q4. Trade balance is
calculated as ratio to GDP. Argentinas external debt data are from the IMF WEO for 1993-2001 and
2002-2011. We calculate two measures of the sovereigns indebtedness; the rst measure is the average
external debt to GDP ratio. We also compute the ratio of the countrys debt service (including short-
term debt) to its GDP for Argentina. Bond spreads are from the J.P. Morgans Emerging Market
Bond Index (EMBI) Global for Argentina for 1998Q1-2001Q3 and 2001Q4-2011Q4. Real exchange
rate is computed based on monthly Argentina nominal exchange rates against the US dollar, Argentina
CPI, and US CPI from IMF IFS for 1993Q1-2001Q3 and 2001Q4-2011Q4. We compare our simulation
results with those of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).
As is obvious in Table 5, the model matches business cycle statistics in data in both pre-default and
post-default periods. Our model replicates volatile consumption and trade balance/GDP volatility,
both of which are prominent features of emerging economy business cycle models as in Aguilar and
26See also Arellano (2008) and Yue (2010) for similar treatment of simulation.
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Gopinath (2007) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005). Trade balance/output standard deviation in the
model is much higher than that of data because trade balance in our model also includes variations
of imports merely driven by real exchange rate uctuations. Moreover, it also generates a negative
correlation between trade balance and output.
Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics for Argentina
Data Model A and G (2006) Arellano (2008)
Before Default
Consumption Std/Output Std 1.14 1.65 1.06 1.10
Trade balance/Output Std. Dev. (%) 0.38 2.96 0.21 0.26
Corr. (Trade Balance/GDP, Output) -0.87 -0.10 -0.18 -0.25
After Default
Consumption Std/Output Std 1.14 1.65 - -
Trade balance/Output Std. Dev. (%) 0.40 3.05 - -
Corr. (Trade Balance/GDP, Output) -0.92 -0.04 - -
Source: Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), MECON
On non-business cycle statistics, the model shows relations among bond spreads, debt/GDP ratio
and output, as in the data in both pre-default and post-default periods. Bond spreads are positively
correlated with debt/GDP ratio, but negatively correlated with output. This is because default
probability is high, leading to higher spreads when debt/GDP ratio is high and output is low. Our
simulation also reproduces similar levels of average bonds spreads and volatility of spreads in both
pre-default and post-default periods, though simulated moments in post-default periods are closer to
those in the data. However, we see some deviations of average debt/GDP ratio from the total debt
service/GDP ratio in data in both pre-default and post-default periods.
What makes our model unique compared to previous studies is that our model generates four
new statistics of the real exchange rate which match with the data. Among four moments, it is
noteworthy that the current model replicates a higher average real exchange rate in the post-default
period than in the pre-default periods, as observed in the data. We also explain that the real exchange
rate negatively correlates with output, but positively correlates with spreads in both the pre-default
and post-default periods. Simulated real exchange rate volatility is 9.6%, close to data (5.0%) in the
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pre-default period, whereas it is 9.4%, much lower than data (27.6%) in the post-default period.
Table 5: Non-Business Cycle Statistics for Argentina (in quarterly frequency)1
Data Model A and G (2006) Arellano (2008)
Target Statistics
Default Probability 3.3 3.4 0.92 3.0
Non-target Statistics
Before Default
Average Debt/GDP ratio 45.4 / 8.0 13.5 - 5.95
Corr. (Spreads, Output)2 -0.62 -0.19 -0.29 -0.29
Average Bond Spreads2 7.6 5.9 3.58
Bond Spreads Std. Deviations (%)2 2.7 5.8 8.00 6.38
Corr. (Debt/GDP, Spreads)2 0.92 / 0.93 0.38 -
Average Real Exchange Rate3 0.95 0.98 -
Real Exchange Rate Std. Deviations (%) 4.7 9.4 -
Corr. (Exchange, Output) -0.56 -0.18
Corr. (Exchange, Spreads)2 0.62 0.84
After Default
Average Debt/GDP ratio 75.3 / 19.8 11.7 -
Corr. (Spreads, Output)4 -0.73 -0.16 -
Average Bond Spreads4 6.7 / 22.9 6.2 -
Bond Spreads Std. Deviations4 4.0 / 23.1 5.9 -
Corr. (Debt/GDP, spreads)4 0.95 / 0.83 0.32 -
Average Real Exchange Rate3 2.23 1.05 -
Real Exchange Rate Std. Deviations (%) 31.5 9.5 -
Corr. (Exchange, Output) -0.65 -0.20
Corr. (Exchange, Spreads)4 0.55 0.74
Source: Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Datastream, IMF IFS and WEO, MECON
1 Spreads corresponds to spreads on foreign currency denominated bonds.
2 Data for spreads are from 1997Q1 to 2001Q4 for Argentina.
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3 Over 10 quarters
4 Excluding autarky periods.
Figure 6 contrasts the simulated process with the actual dynamics of the real exchange rate of
Argentina before and after default. We replicate two features of real exchange rate movements around
defaults. In the model, before defaults, the sovereign receiving a series of low traded goods shocks,
tends to accumulate more debt and faces real exchange rate depreciation. Since a majority of debt
is denominated in foreign currency, this, in turn, increases the burden of payments in terms of local
currency, increasing default probability and forcing the sovereign to default. Once the sovereign de-
clares default, it su¤ers output costs due to default and loses access to the market. By defaulting, the
sovereign enjoys higher consumption of traded goods, indicating a lower marginal utility of consump-
tion, which leads to both a higher price of non-traded goods and a higher overall price level. Thus,
it results in a further depreciation of the real exchange rate. This mechanism drives the equilibrium
depreciation of real exchange rate in the model and it is a plausible explanation of observed pattern
in the data.
Figure 6: Real Exchange Rates Dynamics
Source: Authors computation and IMF IFS
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We compare simulated moments of spreads on domestic and foreign currency bonds in the post-
default periods with data.27 The current model replicates a common feature that average spreads on
domestic currency bonds are higher than those of foreign currency bonds, incorporating real exchange
rate uctuations as we see in the data. Average bond spreads for domestic currency bonds in our
model are three times as high as those of foreign currency bonds. In addition, we also generate much
more volatile domestic currency bonds than foreign currency bonds as observed in the data. Both real
exchange rate uctuations and investor risk aversion interact and produce high and volatile domestic
currency bond spreads.
Table 6: Statistics for Bond Spreads in Post-default Periods
After Default Data1 Model
Domestic currency debt
Average Bond Spreads 26.4 20.3
Bond Spreads Std. Dev.(%) 15.7 10.5
Foreign currency debt
Average Bond Spreads 6.7 / 22.9 6.2
Bond Spreads Std. Dev.(%) 4.0 / 23.1 5.9
Sources: Authors calculations and Bloomberg
1 For domestic currency debt, data are from 2009M1 to 2011M5.
5.4 Comparison with the Model of a Risk-neutral Creditor
To understand the role of a creditors risk aversion, we contrast moments of bond spreads to those
under a conventional sovereign debt model with a risk-neutral creditor, as in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) and Arellano (2008). As reported in Table 8, average bond spreads in the current model are
higher and closer to the data than those in a model with a risk-neutral creditor in both pre- and post-
default periods. Moreover, the current model generates higher standard deviations of bond spreads
than the model with a risk-neutral creditor. These are associated with high average bond spreads,
since we assume no spreads when the sovereign is in autarky.
What drives a large di¤erence in average bond spreads is the risk aversion of the creditor. Both
27Given the lack of spreads data on domestic currency bonds before 2009M1, we focus on moments of spreads in
post-default periods.
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average bond spreads and the standard deviation in the current model are higher and closer to the
data than those in a traditional sovereign debt model with a risk-neutral creditor. In a standard
model with a risk-neutral creditor, bond spreads do not include any spread premia since bond prices
are simply determined by default probability. On the contrary, in the current model with the risk-
averse creditor, bond prices are determined by interaction between stochastic discount factors and
expected payo¤, as shown in equation (25) and (26). Risk premia, due to risk aversion of the creditor,
are included in bond spreads and increase spreads close to the data.
Table 7: Statistics for Bond Spreads
Data Baseline Model - Risk-neutral creditor
Before Default
Average Bond Spreads 7.6 5.9 1.1
Bond Spreads Std. Dev.(%) 2.7 5.8 2.4
After Defaults/Restructurings
Average Bond Spreads 6.7 / 22.9 6.2 0.8
Bond Spreads Std. Dev.(%) 4.0 / 23.1 5.9 2.0
Sources: Authors computations and Bloomberg
6 Model Implications
In this section, we explore determinants of real exchange rate dynamics. Key parameters inuencing
real exchange rate dynamics include income processes, elasticity of substitution, and share of foreign
currency debt. Hence, we rst report the e¤ects of income processes on default probability and real
exchange rate moments. We then examine inuence of share of foreign currency debt.
6.1 Volatility of Income Processes and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Table 8 reports key moment statistics under di¤erent values of the standard deviation of endowments
T and N , elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods  and discount rate
, leaving other parameters at their benchmark values.
Lower discount rates yield both a higher default probability and a higher level of debt. When the
sovereign is less patient and willing to increase current consumption, the soverign tends to accumulate
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more debt resulting in frequent defaults. Real exchange rate moments are similar to those in the
baseline case.
When tradable and non-tradable goods are highly substitutable ( = 2:5), the sovereign can
smooth volatility of consumption of tradable goods by substituting with non-tradable goods. This
results in a smaller change in marginal substitution of consumption, leading to a smaller change in
the real exchange rate. Therefore, real exchange rate depreciation and volatility are smaller than
those under the benchmark case.
Volatile income processes for both traded and non-traded goods result in higher default probability
and lower level of debt. Due to an increase in volatility of income realization, the sovereign tends
to default more frequently with a lower level of debt. Through positive correlation between the real
exchange rate and spreads, volatile income processes for both traded and non-traded goods relate to
high standard deviations of the real exchange rate in both pre-default and post-default periods.
Table 8: Model Statistics for Argentina (in quarterly frequency)
Baseline   T N
0.80 0.96 0.8 2.5 0.02 0.058 0.02 0.058
Default probability (%) 3.4 3.8 1.6 1.8 0.5 1.9 3.9 2.0 4.7
Before Default
Average Debt/GDP (%) 13.5 16.6 3.0 21.2 33.2 16.7 12.7 15.0 13.0
Average Real Exchange Rate 0.98 0.98 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
Real Exchange Rate Std. Dev. (%) 9.4 9.3 8.8 5.8 1.9 7.6 9.9 8.1 10.3
After Default
Average Debt/GDP (%) 11.7 14.4 3.1 19.1 32.1 15.1 11.1 13.3 11.3
Average Real Exchange Rate 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.05
Real Exchange Rate Std. Dev (%) 9.5 9.5 8.6 5.9 1.9 7.6 9.8 8.1 10.3
Source: Authors calculation
6.2 Share of Foreign Currency Bonds and Real Exchange Rate
Table 9 shows how default probability, average debt and real exchange rate moments change under
di¤erent values of share of foreign currency debt 1   leaving other parameters at their benchmark
values. Smaller share of foreign currency debt leads to lower default probability and lower average real
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exchange rate in post-default periods; if the sovereign issues more debt in domestic currency (1  =
0:5), one-percentage real exchange rate depreciation does not increase much burden of payments in
terms of local currency, reducing default probability. The smaller share of foreign currency debt also
results in higher average debt. On the contrary, standard deviations of real exchange rate are similar
to those under a large share of foreign currency debt.
Table 9: Model Statistics for Argentina (in quarterly frequency)
Share of foreign currency debt
1   = 0:5 1   = 0:75 1   = 0:99
Default probability (%) 3.05 3.2 3.4
Before Default
Average Debt/GDP ratio (%) 17.9 15.3 13.5
Average Real Exchange Rate 0.965 0.973 0.98
Real Exchange Rate Std. Dev. (%) 9.8 9.7 9.4
After Default
Average Debt/GDP ratio (%) 15.6 13.5 11.7
Average Real Exchange Rate 1.037 1.04 1.05
Real Exchange Rate Std. Dev (%) 9.8 9.7 9.5
Source: Authors calculation
7 Conclusion
Emerging countries experience real exchange rate depreciations around default events. This paper
attempts to explore this observed evidence within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in
which bond issuance in local and foreign currencies is explicitly embedded and the real exchange rate
and default risk are determined endogenously. Our quantitative analysis using data of Argentina,
replicates a link between real exchange rate depreciation and default probability before and after
defaults.
In the model, before default, the sovereign, receiving a series of low tradable goods shocks, tends
to accumulate more debt and faces real exchange rate depreciation. Since a majority of debt is
denominated in foreign currency, this, in turn, increases the burden of payments in terms of local
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currency, increasing default probability and forcing the sovereign to default. Once the sovereign
declares default, it su¤ers output costs due to default and loses access to the market. By defaulting,
the sovereign prefers to have a higher consumption of traded goods indicating lower marginal utility
of consumption, which leads to both a higher price of non-traded goods and a higher overall price
level. Thus, the default ends up with a further depreciation of the real exchange rate. This mechanism
drives the equilibrium depreciation of real exchange rate in the model, and it is a plausible explanation
of the observed pattern in the data.
So far, we have analyzed the endogenous real exchange rate dynamics before and after the default
in the framework, where income processes are exogenous and output cost is xed. It will be possible
to consider interactions between real exchange rate depreciation and output costs due to default as
in Mendoza and Yue (2012). This might be a potential area future research could explore.
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A Computation Algorithm
The procedure to compute the stationary equilibrium distribution of the model is the following.
(i) First, we set grids on the space of asset holdings as B = [ 0:6; :::::::; 0] . The limits of the asset
space are set to ensure that the limits do not bind in equilibrium.
(ii) Second, we set nite grids on the space of endowments of both the sovereign and the creditor.
The limits of each endowment space are big enough to include large deviations from the average
value of shocks. We approximate stochastic income processes given by equation (38) using a discrete
Markov chain of equally-spaced grids. Moreover, we calculate the transition matrix based on the
probability distribution (yt+1jyt).
(iii) Third, we set the initial value of the real exchange rate (e0 = 1, and eD0 = 1).
(iv) Fourth, we set the initial value for equilibrium bond price. We use the risk-free bond price
(q1 = q = (1 + r) 1) for the baseline value for equilibrium bond price.
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(v) Fifth, given the baseline equilibrium bond price (qH0 = q) and real exchange rate (e0 = 1),
we solve for the countrys and its creditors optimization problems. This procedure nds the value
function as well as default decisions. In order to solve the limit of the nite-horizon problem, we solve
backwards. We start with the problem of last period. Then, we solve the last two-period problem.
We keep iterating the process until we obtain the converged value function.
We rst guess the value function (V 0, V D;0) and iterate it using the Bellman equation to nd
the xed value (V , V D;), given the baseline bond price and real exchange rate. By iterating the
Bellman function, we also derive the optimal asset policy function (b0). In addition, we obtain default
choices, which require comparison of values of defaulting and non-defaulting choices. By contrasting
these two values, we calculate a default set. Based on the derived default set, we also evaluate the
default probability using a transition matrix.
(vi) Sixth, using a default set in step (v) and bond price equations (25) and (26), we compute
the new bond price (qH1 and q
F
1 ). Then, we iterate (v) to have a xed value of the equilibrium bond
price.
(vii), Seventh, using the default set in step (v) and equation (12), (13), (21), (22) and (27), we
calculate the new real exchange rate (e1, eD1 ). Then we iterate step (v) and (vi) to have a xed value
of equilibrium real exchange rate.
B Data and Empirical Analysis in Section 2
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Table A1: Details and Sources of Marcoeconomic Variables
Variable Frequency Source
Real exchange rate Monthly IMF IFS
Ratings Monthly S&P, Moodys
GDP growth rate Yearly IMF WEO
Debt service-to-GDP Yearly IMF WEO
Institutional quality Monthly PRC
IMF program Monthly IMF
LIBOR 1-year Monthly LIBOR
GDP growth rate di¤erential Yearly IMF WEO
Real interest rate di¤erential Yearly IMF IFS
Net foreign asset-to-GDP Yearly IMF IFS
Real oil price shock Yearly IMF WEO
We briey explain how instruments used for regression analysis are appropriate. First, for the
pre-default period, we use both US GDP deviation from the trend and the US Treasury bill rate as
instruments for lagged real exchange rates. These variables, entered with a lag, are correlated with
sovereignsreal exchange rates against the US dollar, but not with default probability of sovereigns.
Moreover, in the rst-stage regression, these variables are signicant at 1 percent, and the specication
ts the data well, shown by high Adj-R2 and small root mean square errors (MSE).
Table A2: 1st-stage Regression Results for the Pre-Default period
Dependent variable: Real Exchange rates, lagged (A) Baseline.
Estimation Least square
US GDP deviation from trend, lagged -19.67*** (4.55)
US Treasury rate, lagged 0.23*** (0.01)
Samples 106
Adj-R2 0.71
Root MSE 0.51
Note: *, **, *** denote signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Next, for the post-default period, ratings of foreign countries and sovereignsinstitutional quality
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are considered to be appropriate instruments for ratings, which are proxy for default choice / default
probability. Sovereignsratings are correlated with ratings on foreign countries, since the method by
how credit rating agencies assess other countries with similar economic size and macro framework
inuence sovereignsratings. In addition, institutional quality is one of the factors which credit rating
agencies use to judge sovereignsratings. As the rst-stage regression results clearly show, they are
signicant at 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively, and have high explanatory power (high Adj-R2).
Table A3: 1st-stage Regression Results for the Post-Default Period
Dependent variable: Ratings, lagged (A) Baseline.
Estimation Least square
Ratings on foreign countries, lagged -0.27** (0.12)
Institutional quality, lagged 0.10*** (0.018)
Samples 60
Adj-R2 0.75
Root MSE 2.08
Note: *, **, *** denote signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
C Share of Foreign Currency Debt
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Table A4: Average and Variance of Shares of Foreign Currency Debt
Before/after defaults/restructuring After defaults/restructuring
from t  5 to t+ 5 from t to t+ 5
Average Variance Average Variance
Argentina 2001-5 99% 0% 98% 0%
Belize 2006-7 100% 0% 100% 0%
Belize 2012-13 100% 0% 100% 0%
Cote DIvoire 100% 0% 100% 0%
Dominican Rep. 98% 1% 98% 0%
Ecuador 1998-2000 100% 0% 100% 0%
Ecuador 2008-9 100% 0% 100% 0%
Grenada 2004-5 84% 2% 84% 0%
Grenada 2013 74% 0% 74% 0%
Iraq 100% 0% 100% 0%
Moldova 100% 0% 100% 0%
Pakistan 100% 0% 100% 0%
Russia 100% 0% 100% 0%
Seychelles 100% 0% 100% 0%
Ukraine 1998-9 100% 0% 100% 0%
Uruguay 100% 1% 99% 0%
D Figures for Bond Prices
The left panel of Figure A1 shows the bond price schedule with a di¤erent level of new debt issuance
given initial debt of 0.3. Bond price is weakly decreasing with the level of new bond issuance, since
it incorporates default probability, which is weakly increasing with respect to the level of new bond
issuance. Next, the bond price schedule with the initial level of debt is presented in the right panel
of Figure A1. At each level of debt, bond price is computed based on an optimal amount of bond
issuance. This gure clearly shows that bond price is weakly decreasing with level of initial debt
because expected default probability is higher for the high level of initial debt.
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Figure A1: Bond Prices
(A) Bond Price with Current Debt Fixed at 0:3
(B) Bond Price with Current Debt
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